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Unrestricted Private Employee Drug Testing
Programs: An Invasion of the Worker's Right to
Privacy
INTRODUCTION
Allan Bitwell,' a mid-level manager for a Fortune 500 com-
pany,' arrived at work one Monday morning recently and was told
that all personnel in his department were required to provide urine
samples immediately. Bitwell's company had notified its employ-
ees it had decided to institute a drug screening program 3 as part
of the firm's comprehensive plan of detecting and eliminating em-
ployee drug use.4 Unfortunately for Bitwell, an occasional week-
1. Bitwell is a hypothetical company officer for the purposes of this article. White-
collar drug use recently has drawn increasing attention with the recognition that managers
of many businesses are in an excellent position to hide drug use. Company officers can close
their office doors and delegate assignments to co-workers. Among company officers at work,
cocaine has become the drug of choice because the drug's "high" generates strong feelings
of increased job skill and confidence. Moreover, cocaine use is more easily hidden to hide
than, for example, marijuana since cocaine generally is snorted rather than smoked and has
no discernible odor. Castro, Battling the Enemy Within, TIME, Mar. 17, 1986, at 52, 54.
2. To detect drug use, about one-quarter of the Fortune 500 companies presently
require that job applicants submit to urinalysis. The first corporations to institute drug
testing were aerospace companies, airlines and railroads. Businesses now requiring drug
testing include such giants as AT&T, IBM, General Motors Corp., Ford Motor Co., Du
Pont, Exxon, Lockheed, Shearson Lehman, Federal Express, United Airlines, TWA, Hoff-
man-La Roche, and the New York Times. These firms now require all job applicants to
submit a urine sample, and allow random sweeps of certain classes of employees such as
employees who do hazardous work or those who have been involved in accidents. While
drug testing of all employees is rare, an additional 20% of Fortune 500 companies are
expected, within twelve months, to implement at least some form of drug testing. Stille,
Drug Testing: The Scene is Set for a Dramatic Legal Collision Between the Rights of
Employers and Workers, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 7, 1986, at 1, col. 1; Castro, supra note 1, at 52-
61.
Spreading even more rapidly than the use of drug testing through urinalysis is the use of
employee assistance programs (EAP's). These programs go beyond employee counseling
programs to provide workers and their supervisors information about the risks of using
drugs. The programs offer counseling to troubled workers and their families and direct
them to intensive treatment facilities if needed. Many companies have set up toll-free num-
bers that workers and their families can call to get advice on their drug problems. Castro,
supra note 1, at 57.
3. Those most often tested are job applicants. The Council on Marijuana and Health
surveyed 35 companies and found 29% tested all job applicants and 26% tested employees
under certain conditions. Drug tests were administered to nearly five million Americans in
1985. Stille, supra note 2, at 1, col. 1.
4. Id. Corporations view the new, inexpensive drug tests as the remedy for a host of
problems: employee theft, absenteeism, rising health care costs, accidents, shoddy work-
manship and low productivity. Studies have estimated that businesses lose up to three bil-
lion dollars a year due to employee drug use. Id. While alcohol is a powerful drug which
1
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end cocaine user,5 he now faced termination either for refusing to
submit to the test or for receiving a positive laboratory report.6 A
quick call to his attorney revealed there was no realistic legal ba-
sis for refusing to take the test.7 The attorney also stated that any
lawsuit brought against the firm in the event Bitwell was termi-
nated likely would fail.8
Bitwell's situation is one that will be repeated with increasing
regularity as more private companies attempt to deal with the
problem of employee drug use.9 This developing trend has been
documented by the media 0 and has been spotlighted by proposals
of league officials in various professional and amateur sports that
athletes submit to random drug testing.11
Unlike drug testing in the military12 and for public employees, 13
has contributed to these very significant problems, this Comment will focus only on the
growing use of illegal drugs by employees.
5. See supra note 1. In the three year period between 1979 and 1982, one survey
reported that cocaine use by those over the age of 26 had doubled. Cocaine use by well-
known sports and entertainment figures has been well-publicized in recent years, no doubt
contributing to the drug's allure and popularity.
On the down side, cocaine is addicting and can create serious physical and psychological
problems. It can cause hypersensitivity, paranoia, hallucinations and reactions that can
lead to suicide. The well-published deaths of comedian John Belushi, college basketball
player Len Bias and NFL football player Don Rogers have also shown that cocaine can
kill.
6. See infra note 22 for a discussion of the possibility of receiving a false positive
report.
7. See infra notes 118-42 and accompanying text. An employee can always refuse
to take the test, but the price for that refusal can include loss of job and accompanying
stigma, embarrassment, and possible difficulties in finding new employment.
8. Several theories attempted have been unsuccessful including wrongful termina-
tion, retaliation, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach
of covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See infra text accompanying notes 118-42.
9. People over 40 tend to be more dependent on alcohol, while those under 40 tend
to prefer the use of drugs. Marijuana use is more common among blue-collar workers, and
cocaine is the drug of choice among white-collar workers. Linquist, Drugs Said Rampant
in Every Industry, San Diego Union, Nov. 30, 1985, at B-I, col. 4.
10. Susser, Legal Issues Raised by Drugs in the Workplace, 36 LAB. L.J. 42 (1985).
"Over the last 20 years, employers in every industry have been forced to deal with ... the
tremendous increase in the use of drugs." Id. at 42. Surveys reveal that up to twenty-five
percent of the workforce are substance abusers. See Stille, supra note 3, at 53.
11. One sport receiving considerable attention is major league baseball. Several
teams have instituted testing plans which are voluntary and non-punitive. The Baltimore
Orioles have used a plan which provides for administering up to six urinalysis tests to each
ballplayer per year. Only the player, his agent and the testing physician know the results.
The program is designed to identify those players who may need rehabilitation and the
ballclub is not allowed to "sanction" a player if he needs treatment. Kreidler, Padres Urge
Drug Testing, San Diego Union, Mar. 6, 1986, at C-I, col. 3. Similar voluntary plans have
been adopted in other professional sports, as well as in sports at the college and high school
level. Of course, an employee who voluntarily participates in a drug testing program waives
his expectation of privacy.
12. Armed services drug testing resulted from a Department of Defense policy
change that occurred on December 28, 1981, when the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued
a memorandum which allowed evidence obtained by compulsory urinalysis to be used for
2
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there is no case law precisley defining the scope of private drug
testing. 14 What is clear is that without statutory regulation similar
to that prohibiting or limiting the use of polygraphs, 15 private em-
ployers are free to impose whatever type of drug testing program
they deem necessary.
Currently, a private employee's rights are quite limited. Fourth
amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure, as
well as any constitutional right to privacy, only protects against
intrusions by government employers16 and others where the em-
ployee can successfully invoke a "state action" argument.17 While
private employees may have a tort remedy for invasion of privacy
in most jurisdictions,' 8 this remedy does little to prevent employ-
ers from violating worker privacy in the first place. Moreover, as
private employers make use of advanced Orwellian technology for
various reasons, employees can expect a continuing erosion of
disciplinary action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). In Murray v.
Haldeman, 16 M.J. 74 (C.M.A. 1983), the U.S. Court of Military Appeals ruled that urine
specimens are not included within protections accorded to service members by article 31 of
the UCMJ and the fifth amendment. The court recognized the "disastrous effects occa-
sioned by the wrongful use of narcotics on the health, morale and fitness for duty of per-
sons in the armed forces." Id. at 78. The appellate court held that even when a service
member uses drugs in private and while on extended leave, that use is service connected
and therefore punishable. Moreover, a military order providing the means for compelling
production of a urine specimen "is a reasonable procedure in the context of the military
society." Id. at 83.
As a Naval officer between 1980 and 1984, the author can attest that drug tests follow-
ing the 1981 drug test memorandum were frequent and exempted no one. This author can
also attest that being ordered to urinate into a bottle with another man witnessing the
operation from start to finish not only was humiliating and embarrassing, but also signifi-
cantly affected this author's right to be let alone.
13. Public employees can be terminated for refusing to take a test when suspected
drug usage jeopardizes the public agency's ability to carry out its statutory duties. See
infra notes 61-104 and accompanying text. Though no courts have allowed a public entity
to randomly test all employees, the Presidential Commission on Organized Crime has
called for the mandatory drug testing of all federal employees and people hired by federal
contractors. President Reagan and Attorney General Meese strongly support the recom-
mendation. The presidents of both the National Federation of Federal Employees and the
American Federation of Government Employees, who represent some 850,000 workers,
have called the proposal a "witch hunt" and unconstitutional. Carmichael, Drug Use Con-
cerns, Individual Rights Collide on Capitol Hill, San Diego Union, Apr. 6, 1986, at C-i,
ol. I.
14. See infra notes 118-42 and accompanying text.
15. Twenty-one states prohibit employers from requiring that an individual submit to
a polygraph examination as a condition of employment. Nine states prohibit an employer
from even requesting that an applicant or employee submit to such an examination.
Twenty-eight states have statutes requiring that examiners be licensed. Nagle, The Poly-
graph in the Workplace, 18 U. RICH L. REv. 43, 67 (1983).
16. See infra notes 61-104 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 105-17. See also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
18. See Infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
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their elusive "right" to privacy. 19
Some contend that reducing drug abuse among employees
whose work involves potential danger to themselves, other employ-
ees, or members of the public is an important societal goal.20
However, others have argued that blanket company-wide drug
testing is used as much for identifying non-conformists and com-
pany troublemakers as for eliminating drug abusers whose job
performance is below average.21 Further, even if the drug tests are
accurate,22 they penalize a one-time user the same as an addict.
23
19. There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at
any given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in
on any individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched
everybody all the time. But at any rate they could plug into your wire whenever
they wanted to.
G. ORWELL, 1984 3 (1949).
"During the late 1950's and early 1960's, the federal government devised a lie detection
seat that [could] be used without the knowledge of the individual being examined.... The
future may witness sensing devices implanted in the human body capable of transmitting
data on psychological and physiological changes." Craver, The Inquisitorial Process in
Private Employment, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 30 (1977) (footnote omitted). And, as if
testing for drugs is not enough, genetic screening of prospective employees is already a
reality. These tests are conducted ostensibly to determine if an individual carries a particu-
lar trait that might make him more susceptible to harm from certain chemicals present in
the workplace. According to a 1982 survey of the nation's largest industries performed by
the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, "59 corporations said they would be-
gin some form of genetic screening of their workers within the next five years; 17 said that
they had previously used the procedure, and six said they used it currently." Goodrich, Are
Your Genes Right For Your Job?, CAL LAW., May 1983, at 24.
20. See infra notes 61-104 and accompanying text. Drug testing in these kinds of
situations arguably serves an important safety function.
21. Civil libertarians fear that drug testing may become an easy way for manage-
ment to terminate employees.
22. The actual testing of the urine sample opens up an extremely important issue
since testing is not completely accurate. A positive reading labels the employee as a drug
user which can ruin the worker's entire career whether the test was accurate or not. The
most widely used urinalysis test is EMIT (Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Test) and is
advertised as ninety-seven to ninety-nine percent accurate. The other commonly used test is
the RIA (radioimmunoassay). The RIA's require the use of radioisotopes that emit radia-
tion, and for that reason require the test be performed by a technician in a lab licensed to
handle such materials. Maugh, Drug Tests' Reliability is Limited, Experts Say, L.A.
Times, Oct. 27, 1986, Part I, at 20, col. 2. The manufacturer warns companies which use
the test that no decision affecting an employee's career should be made without a backup
test. A backup test is suggested because certain prescription medicines and over-the-
counter drugs such as antihistamines, propanolamine (found in appetite suppressants), and
ephedrine (found in many cough syrups) can yield positive results. However, even a backup
test is unable to distinguish between morphine from one swallowed poppy seed and mor-
phine that has been injected. Id. While many large corporations perform backup tests, a
significant number do not to save the additional expense.
Another problem is that the quality level of the testing varies considerably among the
largely unregulated private laboratories. In several studies, the error rates generally have
fluctuated between three and twenty percent. In the biggest bungle so far, the Army admit-
ted in 1984 that its laboratories had mishandled about half of the urine tests on 60,000
soldiers, and that hundreds of the soldiers received results from specimens that were not
their own. Back in the private sector, alleged laboratory inaccuracies have spawned several
lawsuits. See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text; Stille, supra note 2, at 1, col. 1.
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Civil libertarians argue that any possible benefits from the cur-
rent state-of-the-art in drug detection can only be achieved at the
expense of a much higher goal: freedom from unwarranted intru-
sions into the employee's private life.24 This drug testing trend is
especially intrusive for the vast majority of employees who have
no union or arbitration protection.25 Moreover, libertarians view
drug testing as symptomatic of infringement upon a wide range of
personal freedoms.26
This Comment will discuss the concept of employee privacy in
the context of private employment drug testing. First, the consti-
tutional basis of the right to privacy, as well as the invasion of
privacy tort, will be addressed.2 7 Second, this Comment will ex-
amine the current state of public employee drug testing as the
background for the private employee drug testing, and will include
a discussion of state action which permits constitutional privacy
arguments. 28 Third, this Comment will explore the current status
of private employee drug testing, with particular emphasis on the
analogy between drug and polygraph testing. 29 Finally, this Com-
ment will propose a legislative solution which will limit and define
the extent to which private employers may test their employees for
drugs. 30
A contributing factor to test inaccuracy is the competitive bidding process that busi-
nesses often use to select the drug testing laboratory. The lowest bidder often is awarded
the job, and must cut corners and compromise results to realize a profit. Stille, supra note
2, at 24, col. 4.
23. Drugs differ in the length of time they can be detected in the blood. Toxicologists
have agreed on the following detection periods: amphetamines-two to four days; barbitu-
ates-twelve hours to three weeks; cocaine-two to four days; heroin-two to four days;
marijuana-three to ten days (occasional user) one to two months (regular user); metha-
done-two to four days; PCP-one to thirty days. Maugh, supra note 22, at 21, col. 2-3.
24. Some have viewed the boom in urinalysis testing as the "yellow peril" which
forces citizens to prove their innocence of crimes they haven't been charged with. "What
starts with little plastic cups ends in the urinalysis state." THE NEw REPUBLIC, Mar. 31,
1986, at 8.
It is generally recognized that for unionized workers, management's authority to develop
and implement workplace rules is restrained by the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. Miller, Worker Privacy and Collective Bargaining, 33 LAB. L. 154 (1982).
25. See infra notes 180-95 and accompanying text.
26. Keisling, The Case Against Privacy, STUDENT LAW., Sept. 1984, at 27:
The "right to privacy" has also been used to argue against all laws relating to the
use and sale of heroin and other drugs, against laws that require the use of certain
safety devices in automobiles, and against electronic scanning machines in super-
markets. Privacy advocates have also expressed concern about pay cable television
since the billing process would enable outsiders to know what you're watching....
27. See infra notes 31-60 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 61-117 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 118-95 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 196-231 and accompanying text.
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I. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
To the private employee, freedom from intrusion into his off-
work behavior may appear to be a constitutional right. As the hy-
pothetical Allan Bitwell discovered, this is not necessarily so. Most
employees facing a drug test as a condition of continued employ-
ment will find that there are few safeguards to temper incursions-
into their privacy.31
The courts and legal scholars have long struggled to define the
scope of an individual's right to privacy.32 Both are still trying to
develop a definition which adequately fulfills the needs of a society
seeking both to protect individualism and to promote efficiency in
government and business.33
A specific guarantee of the right to personal privacy does not
exist in the United States Constitution. " However, the right to
privacy has been generally defined as:
The right to be let alone; the right of a person to be free fom
unwarranted publicity ... [t]he right of an individual (or corpo-
ration) to withhold himself and his property from public scru-
tiny, if he so chooses. It is said to exist only so far as its asser-
tion is consistent with law or public policy, and in a proper case
equity will interfere, if there is no remedy at law, to prevent an
injury threatened by the invasion of, or infringement upon, this
right from motives of curiosity, gain, or malice.3 5
In Griswold v. State of Connecticut,"6 the United States Supreme
Court found "zones of privacy" to exist in the first, 7 third,3 8
31. The common law of most states recognizes the concept of a right to privacy.
States which do not recognize the right to privacy include Minnesota, Nevada, North Da-
kota, and Wyoming. Twenty-two states have at least a limited statutory recognition of the
right to privacy. R. SMITH, COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS 17-18
(1981).
32. A typical definition of privacy is grounded in what privacy should achieve. The
purposes of privacy include "the promotion of liberty, autonomy, selfhood, and human rela-
tions, and furthering the existence of a free society." Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of
Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980).
33. For an excellent discussion of the privacy issue, see A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM (1967). Westin has defined privacy as the "claim of individuals, groups, or insti-
tutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them
is communicated to others." Id. at 7.
34. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). "In a line of decisions, however, going
back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 ... (1891), the
Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or
zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution." Id.
35. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1075 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted).
36. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold was the landmark case striking down a Connecti-
cut statute which forbade not only the use of contraceptives, but also aiding or counseling
others in the use of contraceptives. Griswold is widely viewed as the first major modern
case in which the Supreme Court used a substantive due process approach to protect the
fundamental right of privacy. R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK AND J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.27 (1986).
37. "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting ... the right of the people peacea-
1986]
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fourth, 9 fifth, 40 and ninth, 41 amendments. The Court stated that
these "[s]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them
life and substance. . . .Various guarantees create zones of pri-
vacy. "42 The Court later held in Roe v. Wade that the right to
privacy was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 43 The Court deter-
mined that the right to privacy is "founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of personal liberty ....
Four years after Wade, the Supreme Court noted that two basic
interests are protected under the constitutional right to privacy;
"[o]ne is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters, and another is the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions. 45 These privacy rights, aris-
ing under substantive due process protections, have yet to be fully
delineated by the Supreme Court.46 However, based on privacy
bly to assemble.... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
38. "No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the con-
sent of the Owner nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. Ill.
39. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .. " U.S. CONsT. amend.
IV.
40. "No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. " US.
CoNsT. amend. V.
41. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CoNsr. amend. IX.
42. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (citation omitted).
43. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). This case extended the right to privacy
found to exist in Griswold to the abortion issue. Roe v. Wade and its progeny have severely
limited the state legislatures' ability to regulate abortions.
44. Id., 410 U.S. at 153. The Court stated, however, that the privacy right involved
was not absolute but that the abortion decision is included in the right to privacy. The
Court stated: "We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes the abor-
tion decision, but that this right must be considered against important state interests in
regulation." Id. at 154.
45. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977). In Whalen, the Court found that
although prescription drug users in New York had a privacy interest in not having the state
gather information about their drug usage, this interest, under a "rational basis" standard,
was outweighed by the state's interest in gathering the data. The Court found that neither
of the two privacy interests defined were materially impaired by the statute.
46. In general, the Supreme Court has protected privacy rights as they relate to
traditional values such as family, marriage and procreation. R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK AND
J. YOUNG, supra note 36, § 18.28. The Court has consistently applied a "strict scrutiny"
test to these classes of fundamental rights which invalidates any state law limiting these
rights unless the state can show a compelling state interest in the restriction. Id. In a recent
case addressing the privacy issue, the Supreme Court has refused to extend the right of
privacy to consensual homosexual sodomy. Bowers v. Hardwick, - U.S. _, 106 S. Ct.
2841 (1986). In Bowers, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision that the Constitution
does not confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy. The majority
noted that none of the fundamental rights found in prior cases involving family relation-
7
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decisions to date, strong arguments can be made that random
drug screening programs violate the often quoted "right to be let
alone," and that protections against random testing should exist in
the Griswold privacy penumbra, particularly under the fourth and
fifth amendments.47 However, if the right to privacy is a protec-
tion under the Bill of Rights, then the employee must assert "state
action" since these fundamental guarantees apply generally to the
government, not to private employers.48
Apart from the federal courts, the concept of privacy has been
furthered and legitimized by numerous scholarly writings,
grandfathered by the landmark article, The Right to Privacy,
written by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis.49 That arti-
cle, which defined privacy as an independent right, "enjoys the
unique distinction of having synthesized at one stroke a whole new
category of legal rights and of having initiated a new field of
jurisprudence." 50
Dean Prosser has further refined the privacy issue by defining
four distinct torts arising from invasions of privacy.51 The type
ships, marriage or procreation "bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right
of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy .. " Id. at _ 106 S. Ct. at 2844. Further,
the Court stated that its rationale applies even if the homosexual conduct occurs in the
home: "Plainly enough, otherwise illegal conduct is not always immunized whenever it oc-
curs in the home." Id. at -, 106 S. Ct. at 2846. However, in one of two dissents, Justice
Blackmun attached special significance to the fact that the homosexual activity occurred in
the defendant's own home.
"The right of the people to be secure in their ... houses," expressly granted by
the Fourth Amendment, is perhaps the most "textual" of the various constitu-
tional provisions that inform our understanding of the right to privacy, and thus I
cannot agree with the Court's statement that "[tfhe right pressed upon us here
has no . . .support in the text of the Constitution." . . . Indeed, the right of an
individual to conduct intimate relationships in the confines of his or her home
seems to me to be the heart of the Constitution's protection of privacy.
Id. at - 106 S. Ct. at 2853.
For recent discussions on homosexual privacy issues, see generally Apasu-Gbotsu, Survey
on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of Homosexual Activity, 40 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 521 (1986); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Ho-
mosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. RaV. 1285 (1985); Note, Bowers v.
Hardwick: The Extension of the Right to Privacy to Private Consensual Homosexual
Conduct, 10 NOVA LJ. 175 (1985).
47. One federal court already has determined that urinalysis is a search within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. See Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D.
Ga. 1985). In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court stated that the right against self-incrimi-
nation enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which the government may not force
him to surrender to his detriment. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Employer drug testing would
seem to violate that "zone of privacy" by forcing employees to incriminate themselves
through production of their urine samples. In McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122
(S.D. Iowa 1984), affd, 746 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1985), the court stated that a citizen has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the discharge and disposition of his urine.
48. See infra notes 105-17 and accompanying text.
49. 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
50. 62 Am. JUR. 2D Privacy § 2 (1972).
51. Prosser, Privacy, 4 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
8
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most relevant to this Comment is the "[i]ntrusion upon the plain-
tiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs.1 52 This right
to privacy may be violated by the wrongful intrusion into one's
private activities if it is of "such a nature as a reasonable man can
see might and probably would cause mental distress and injury to
anyone possessed of ordinary feelings and intelligence, situated in
like circumstances as the complainant. ... ", Related to this inva-
sion is the tort of public disclosure of embarrassing private facts
about an individual.5 4
In the drug testing case law available, the "invasion" torts de-
scribed by Prosser have proved unsuccessful as causes of action. 55
Since most employers are not likely to publicize either test results
or the reason behind an employee's termination, the "publicizing
of one's private affairs" tort will not be of much help to the em-
ployee. Further, in at least one jurisdiction, if an employee bases
his tort cause of action on "intrusion" alone without public dis-
closure, the burden is on the employee to prove a "blatant and
shocking disregard of his rights, and serious mental or physical
injury or humiliation. 58 Moreover, these causes of action, even if
successful, are only compensatory on a case-by-case basis. On a
company-wide level, these lawsuits likely will do little to curb the
employer's unrestrained ability to perform drug testing.57
The majority of state courts have at least accepted that the
right to privacy exists either by common law or through statute.58
A growing trend towards the express recognition of a right to pri-
vacy is evidenced by individual states passing state constitutional
amendments. Typical of these amendments is article I of the Cali-
fornia Constitution which states that "[a]ll people are by nature
free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these
are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing,
and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, hap-
52. Id. at 389. The other three can be described as: public disclosure of embarrassing
facts about the plaintiff; publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye; appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness. Id.
53. 62 Am. JUR. 2D Privacy, § 13 (1972) (footnote omitted).
54. Id. § 26. See discussion of Satterfield v. Lockheed Missles Space Co., Inc., infra
notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
55. How future cases will be decided, however, is difficult to predict at this time
because of the very small number of cases decided thus far.
56. Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1359, 1370 (D.C.
S.C. 1985). See Infra note 132 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 123-42 and accompanying text.
58. Annotation, Waiver or Loss of Right of Privacy, 57 A.L.R. 3D 16, 32. Among
the states that have passed constitutional amendments declaring a right of privacy are
Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Montana,
South Carolina and Washington. Peck, Extending the Constitutional Right To Privacy in
the New Technological Age, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 893, 897 n.25 (1984).
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piness, and privacy.""9 Similar to the federal constitutional right,
however, state privacy statutes only restrict the actions of state
and municipal employers. State action must be invoked before the
right can be made applicable to a private employer.60
A. Privacy and the Public Employee
Presently, case law on the validity of worker drug testing has
come almost entirely from the public sector. This case law is use-
ful in examining the privacy issue as background to the developing
right to privacy theories in private employment. In particular, the
right to privacy has been an intrinsic part of recent federal and
state court analysis of the fourth amendment prohibition against
unreasonable search and seizure."'
59. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. California voters added privacy as an inalienable right
by constitutional amendment in November 1972. California courts have looked to the
voter's brochure from that election to elicit the legislative intent behind the amendment. In
White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 774, 533 P.2d 222, 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 105 (1975), the
California Supreme Court concluded that the right of privacy was designed primarily to
guard against unnecessary government snooping and collection of records: "[T]he moving
force behind the new constitutional provision was a more focused privacy concern, relating
to the accelerating encroachment on personal freedom and security caused by increased
surveillance and data collection activity in contemporary society." This passage was later
quoted in People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 709, 591 P.2d 919, 926, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431,
438 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979), where, based on this narrow construction,
the Privitera court held that the right to obtain drugs of unproven efficacy (in this case
laetrile as a possible cancer cure) is not a fundamental privacy right.
Similarly, other California courts have held that there is no constitutionally protected
right to engage in the use of illegal drugs even in one's home. See People v. Davis, 92 Cal.
App. 3d 250, 154 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1979) (criminalization of the personal use and possession
of cocaine in the home did not violate the individual's right to privacy); Gillies v. Sacra-
mento City Civil Serv. Bd., 99 Cal. App. 3d 417, 160 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1979) (dismissal of a
police officer because of his expressed intention to use marijuana in the future as he had in
the past did not violate his privacy rights); Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws
v. Gain, 100 Cal. App. 3d 586, 161 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1980) (right of privacy does not guar-
antee adult Californians the right to smoke marijuana in their homes). But see Ravin v.
State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) where the Alaska constitutional privacy provision was
held to protect the use of marijuana in the home in a personal, noncommercial context.
60. See infra notes 105-17 and accompanying text. However, California courts have
held that the constitutional privacy provision is self-executing since the amendment was
intended to "extend various court decisions on privacy to insure protection of our basic
rights." Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829, 134 Cal. Rptr.
839, 842 (1976). Since the measure was held to be self-executing, California courts have
held that privacy is protected not only against state action, but also is considered an ina-
lienable right which may not be violated by anyone. See White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757,
533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975); Annenberg v. Southern Cal. Dist. Council of
Laborers, 38 Cal. App. 3d 637, 113 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1974). Thus, while the California right
to privacy is a concept of undetermined parameters, the stage is set for a significant exten-
sion of the right to private employee in random drug testing, an area where there are
several cases currently pending. See infra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
61. Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985). The Allen court
noted that government employees do not surrender their fourth amendment rights merely
because they go to work for the government. The court also noted that the government as
an employer has the same rights as a private employer to oversee its employees and investi-
10
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In Allen v. City of Marietta,62 government employees dis-
charged for refusing to take a urinalysis test brought action
against the city challenging their termination on the grounds that
the city's use of the test was an unreasonable search in violation of
the fourth amendment.63 In Allen, the employer had confirmed
through internal investigation that individuals who worked near
high voltage wires were using marijuana on the job. 4 The district
court first determined that urinalysis is a search within the mean-
ing of the fourth amendment.6 5 The court quoted a Supreme
Court case that held that warrantless searches are "per se unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." 66 The Al-
len court's decision to allow the urinalysis in the absence of a war-
rant turned on an "exception" which involved "a balancing of the
individual's expectation of privacy against the government's right
as an employer (as opposed to the government's right as a law
enforcer) to investigate employee misconduct which is directly rel-
evant to the employee's performance of his duties and the govern-
ment's performance of its statutory responsibilities. 67 Using this
balancing approach in Allen, the court determined that the city
had a right to make warrantless searches to determine whether
employees were using drugs which would affect their ability to
safely perform their work which involved hazardous materials.
Thus, this search was not unreasonable.68
In another case upholding drug testing, several jockeys filed suit
gate misconduct relevant to the worker's performance of duties. Thus, there has been a
balancing of expectations and interests. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
Outside the employer-employee context, the U.S. Supreme Court, in California v.
Clraolo, - U.S. -, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986), reh'g denied, - U.S. _ 106 S. Ct. 3320
(1986), has determined that aerial surveillance of an individual's property by police does
not violate the fourth amendment. In Ciraolo, police obtained a search warrant following a
tip that marijuana was growing in the defendant's backyard. The police secured an air-
plane and flew over the property at 1,000 feet and officers photographed marijuana plants
there which were subsequently seized. The California Court of Appeal reversed the defend-
ant's conviction for cultivation of marijuana, holding that the observation was an unlawful
search, violating the fourth amendment. In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme
Court held that while Ciraolo had manifested a subjective expectation of privacy, he had
no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial observations. The Court stated: "The
Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police traveling in the public airways at
this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye." Id. at
-, 106 S. Ct. at 1813 (footnote omitted).
62. 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
63. Id. at 485.
64. Id. at 484.
65. Id. at 489.
66. Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971)).
67, Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 489.
68. Id. at 491.
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against the New Jersey Racing Commission.69  The jockeys
claimed that certain constitutional rights were violated by the
Commission's alcohol and drug testing. Specifically, their main
claim was that testing without individualized suspicion violated
the fourth amendment.70 The district court, however, held that the
tests were not unconstitutional since the state had made a "suffi-
cient and convincing showing of the need to conduct breathalyzer
and urine tests in the absence of any individualized suspicion.171
This "need" was based on several factors: a) horse racing is one of
a special class of unique industries which have been subject to
pervasive and continuous regulation by the state, b) jockeys are
licensed by the state and have received ample notice of the regula-
tions, and c) the state has a vital interest in ensuring that horse
races are safely and honestly run thus promoting the "integrity"
of the industry.72 Further, even though the state characterized the
tests as "random," the court found that they were administered
neutrally, "with procedural safeguards substituting for the lack of
individualized suspicion. 7'3 Thus the court stated:
[T]hey are not random in the sense that they allow the state
steward unlimited discretion in selecting testees .... All jockeys
are treated equally. The state's program requires all jockeys
submit to breathalyzer tests. Further, every jockey participating
in racing on a given evening has an equal chance of being se-
lected to give a urine sample under the name drawing system.
The state reserves the right solely to vary the total number ofjockeys tested at each race meeting from three to five.74
The court held that under these circumstances the tests did not
violate the jockeys' right to freedom from unreasonable searches
69. Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.C. N.J. 1985) affid, 795 F.2d 1136
(1986).
70. The jockeys also alleged that the regulations violated the due process clause and
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court disagreed with both
claims. As to due process, the court found that hearing provisions allowing the plaintiffs to
challenge test results met the requirements set forth by the Supreme Court. On the equal
protection claim, the court noted that since jockeys do not comprise a "suspect class" the
state's testing program need only have a rational relation to legitimate state purposes. Fur-
ther, the state's classification scheme was found to be rational and furthered the state's
interest in maintaining the safety of the horse racing profession. Id. at 1104-05.
The plaintiffs also argued that the regulations violated their constitutional right to pri-
vacy, asserting that a) the Commission did not have sufficient justification to require the
jockeys to disclose their use of medications; b) even if medication information could be
required, there were inadequate safeguards to prevent against its unauthorized disclosure;
and c) the test results were not protected by any confidentiality or disclosure guidelines,
and that testing in a non-private setting was impermissible. The court found all three
claims to be without merit. Id. at 1105-07.
71. Id. at 1102.
72. Id.




California Western Law Review, Vol. 23 [1986], No. 1, Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol23/iss1/6
84 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
and seizure.7 5
In New York Transit Authority v. Beazer,"8 two former Transit
Authority employees dismissed because they were receiving meth-
adone treatments and two employment applicants refused employ-
ment for the same reason filed a class action suit against the
transit authority." They asked the Supreme Court to rule on a
regulation which stated: "'Employees must not use or have in
their possession narcotics, tranquilizers, drugs ... or parapherna-
lia ... except with the written permission of the Medical Director,
Chief Surgeon of the System.' "178 The plaintiffs argued that such
a rule was illegal under both the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.79
After concluding that the employees had failed to prove a viola-
tion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,80 the Court ad-
dressed the constitutional claim that methadone users are entitled
to be treated like other employees and applicants rather than like
other narcotics users. Reversing the district court, the Supreme
Court upheld the regulation stating that the special classification
created by the rule served the general objectives of safety and effi-
ciency and thus represented a policy choice rationally related to
those goals.81 Both the majority opinion and the dissent drew a
distinction between past alcohol or drug use as a handicap and
present alcohol or drug use that affects job performance.8 2 Re-
garding the latter, the Supreme Court found no restriction on a
public entity's authority to disqualify from employment those indi-
viduals who cannot perform their job adequately because of alco-
hol or drug abuse.83
75. Id. at 1104.
76. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
77. Id. at 576-77.
78. Id. at 572 (quoting Rule 11(b) of the Rules and Regulations of the Transit
Authority).
79. Beazer. 440 U.S. at 577.
80. Id. at 587. The Court stated that statistics showing that 81% of the employees
referred to the Transit Authority's medical director for suspected violation of the narcotics
rule were either black or Hispanic, and that 63% of persons in New York City receiving
methadone treatment were black or Hispanic might establish a weak prima facie case of
discrimination. However, the Court stated that even if they did, they were "assuredly re-
butted by TA's demonstration that its narcotics rule (and the rule's application to metha-
done users) is 'job related.' The District Court's express finding that the rule was not moti-
vated by racial animus forecloses any claim in rebuttal that it was merely a pretext for
intentional discrimination." Id. (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 592.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 593-94. The Court stated that the Transit Authority's blanket exclusion of
persons who regularly use narcotic drugs, including methadone, did not violate the equal
protection clause for failing to include more precise rules for methadone users who have
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A similar result was reached in Division 241 Amalgamated
Transit Union (AFL-CIO) v. Suscy.8 4 In this case, a federal ap-
peals judge ruled that an employee suspected of on-duty intoxica-
tion may be required to submit to a medical examination which
includes blood or urine testing pursuant to agency rules.85 The
court based its holding on the fact that these tests were given in
hospitals only to employees directly involved in serious accidents,
or to those who were suspected of being under the influence of
drugs or alcohol while on the job.8 Thus, no random testing was
involved or approved.
In these cases, the courts have thus expressly upheld testing of
employees in the transportation or other hazardous industries or
when the employees have been involved in accidents. However, in
other public employment situations, courts have held that drug
testing policies violate the fourth amendment unless there is a rea-
sonable suspicion, based on objective facts and reasonable infer-
ences, that the employee is either selling or using drugs in the
workplace. 87
made rehabilitative progress.
84. 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976).
85. Here, a bus driver's union brought suit on behalf of the bus drivers. The relevant
rules stated that "[u]se of illegal drugs is forbidden whether on or off duty" and that
"[e]mployees suspected of being under the influence while on duty ... may be required to
take a blood and urinalysis test." Id. at 1266 (quoting Rule 10 of the Chicago Transit
Authority Rule Book and Chicago Transit Authority General Bulletin G2-75).
86. The court stated the transit authority which enacted the drug testing rules had
"a paramount interest in protecting the public by insuring that bus and train operators are
fit to perform their jobs. In view of this interest, members of plaintiff Union can have no
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to submitting to blood and urine tests." Fur-
ther, "the conditions under which the intrusion [was] made and the manner of taking the
samples [were] reasonable." Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1267 (citations omitted).
But see Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D. D.C. 1986). In this case, a school bus
attendant was discharged for alleged marijuana use discovered by urinalysis testing imple-
mented by her employer, the District of Columbia School System. The school system de-
fended its drug testing program which allowed screening without probable cause or individ-
ual suspicion on public safety grounds, arguing the special public danger if their personnel
who both operated and assisted in the operation of school buses were on drugs. The school
system cited Suscy as authority for allowing the drug testing of bus drivers and mechanics
on safety grounds. However, the Jones court stated that it did not follow that a school bus
attendant should be required to submit to testing. Allowing such testing would be
"equivalent to [testing] imposed by the military and more stringent than that so far found
permissible for the police or for bus drivers in the absence of particularized probable
cause." Jones, 628 F. Supp. at 1509. Thus, the court held that the individual's fourth
amendment rights were violated and granted summary judgment in favor of the union. The
court also established precedent that discharging an employee on the basis of a single,
unconfirmed test (in this case an EMIT test) was arbitrary and capricious in violation of
the Board of Education's own requirements. See supra note 22.
87. Selling or using drugs in the workplace are clearly the kinds of activities which
should override the employee's right to privacy. Drug use in this context has the great
potential of affecting production, morale and safety at all levels.
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In McDonnell v. Hunter,8 employees of the Iowa Department
of Corrections filed suit challenging department policy permitting
urinalysis testing of all correctional officers.89 The lawsuit arose
when prison officials informed McDonnell that he had been seen
with persons suspected of drug trafficking. Officials then de-
manded that he submit to a urinalysis test. McDonnell refused
and was fired. 90 The court of appeals affirmed the district court's
preliminary injunction prohibiting the department from drug test-
ing unless there was a "reasonable suspicion" the employee was
on drugs.91 The court so ruled even though some employees had
signed consent-to-search forms when they were hired. 2 In reach-
ing its decision, the court stated: "The violation of privacy in be-
ing subjected to the searches and tests in question is an irrepara-
ble harm that could reasonably be found to outweigh whatever
increase in security the enforcement of the Department's policies
might produce." 93
In City of Palm Bay v. Bauman,94 the Fifth Court of Appeals
of Florida also affirmed an injunction disallowing random urine
testing of police officers and fire fighters on the ground such test-
ing violated the fourth amendment. 5 The court noted that testing
could, however, be performed during routine physical examina-
tions."" Any other drug testing must involve "'reasonable suspi-
cion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to warrant a cautious person in believing the police officer or fire
fighter to have been on the job using, or after having recently
88. 746 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1984).
89. Id. at 786.
90. Id. Other plaintiffs in the suit were two female correctional officers who were
told that the Department of Corrections planned to conduct strip searches, blood tests and
urinalyses on Department employees and were asked to sign a form consenting to these
tests. The women refused to sign the form and were told they would be subject to com-
pelled searches even without the form. Id.
91. Id. The injunction prohibited strip searches, blood tests and urinalyses unless the
searching officials had "a reasonable suspicion, based on specific objective facts and reason-
able inferences, that the employee is smuggling contraband or under the influence of alco-
hol or a controlled substance." Id. at 787. The court also enjoined the warrantless search of
employees' cars parked outside the prison grounds.
92. Id.
93. Id. However, the court of appeals expressly limited its inquiry to a determination
of whether the district court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction
and did not reach the merits of the dispute: "jO]ur holding does not in any way affect the
defendants' right to litigate the constitutionality of the disputed policies at the trial on the
merits. . . ." Id. (footnote omitted).
94. 475 So.2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
95. Id. at 1323.
96. The court noted that police officers and fire fighters must expect to meet required
minimum physical standards and that physical examinations conducted to insure that those
standards are met should be reasonably expected even though urinalysis would be a part of
the exam. Id. at 1324.
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used, a controlled substance.' ,,97 In reaching its decision that the
city must have a "reasonable suspicion" that a particular em-
ployee has been using drugs, the court stated that "[w]hen the
immediate end sought is weighed against the private right af-
fected, the proposed search and seizure is constitutionally unrea-
sonable." 98 The court noted that the city's reliance on Suscy99 was
misplaced since in that case no random drug testing was contem-
plated or allowed.
The law therefore appears settled that public employers may
require applicants for employment and particular employees to be
tested for drugs where those employees either are suspected of on-
the-job drug usage affecting work performance or are suspected of
selling contraband.100 However, there is no authority for permit-
ting the blanket testing of all federal, state, or city employees, or
even a random screening for drug usage, unless the employee is
involved in a dangerous or highly regulated occupation. 01
The public employee's right to privacy thus has been explicitly
protected and strengthened by a deliberate "balancing" test under
the fourth amendment. 0 2 The public employee's private life will
not come under scrutiny unless there are facts tending to show a
probability of on-the-job drug use which could impair the public
entity's ability to perform its duties.'0 3 Private employers should
be required, by statute, to weigh similar privacy concerns before
implementing any type of drug testing program to prevent unlim-
ited intrusions into the urine or blood of their employees.10 4 Such
a statutory requirement is necessary for non-public employees
97. Id. at 1325 (quoting the ruling of the trial court). The appellate court modified
the trial court's judgment by deleting the requirement of "probable cause." The court
stated that the "federal courts which have considered this and analogous issues have held
that the 'reasonable suspicion standard' (something less than probable cause) is the basis
upon which this type of search can be justified. . . .We see no reason for imposing a
stricter standard than that imposed by the federal courts .. " Id. at 1325-26 (footnote
omitted).
98. Id. at 1325.
99. 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976).
100. See supra notes 62-99 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., discussion of Shoemaker v. Handel, supra notes 69-75 and accompa-
nying text.
102. See, e.g., Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1267 (citations omitted). There, the court stated:
"Whether the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the intrusion
is reasonable are determined by balancing the claims of the public against the interests of
the individual."
103. That police and fire departments require the utmost efficiency from their em-
ployees for the safety of the public is difficult to dispute. See City of Palm Bay v. Bauman,
475 So.2d 1322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). These same considerations should apply to all
public entities since proof of an employee's voluntary on-the-job drug use should mean a
forfeiture of any reasonable expectation of privacy.
104. This should be the focus of restrictive drug testing legislation. Private employ-
ees arguably deserve the same considerations and protections as public employees.
1986]
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since they are unable to invoke the constitutional protections
which public employees can use against the state.
B. State Action and the Private Employee
The right of privacy under the Bill of Rights and in state consti-
tutional provisions restrict government employers and their agents
from infringing on individual privacy rights, but do not restrict
private employers or their agents from infringing privacy rights.100
The requirement of state action makes the extension of protections
accorded public employees to private employees difficult. 108
The Supreme Court recently determined that a four-part test
should be used to determine whether a sufficiently close nexus be-
tween the state and the challenged action exists, so that the action
of the private entity may be treated as the action of the state it-
self.107 Without a finding of state action, a private employee is
unable to use a constitutional right to privacy argument against a
company's drug testing policy.108
Under this nexus test, the courts must look at: 1) whether and
to what extent the state subsidizes the actions of the private en-
tity; 2) whether and to what extent the state regulates the private
employer; 3) whether the private entity is performing a function
which has been the exclusive prerogatiVe of the state; and 4)
whether a symbiotic relationship exists between the state and the
private entity.01  Further, "'a State normally can be held respon-
sible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive
power or has provided such significant encouragement, either
overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that
of the State.' "110 Due to the relatively small number of private
employers who would qualify under that state action test, few em-
ployees are allowed to raise constitutional privacy argu-
ments.Some scholars have nevertheless argued that since private
105. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982) (citations omitted): "[T]he
Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits the states from denying federal constitutional
rights and which guarantees due process, applies to acts of the states, not to acts of private
persons or entities." The fourteenth amendment provides, in pertinent part: "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law. . . ." US. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
106. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 837.
107. Id. at 839-43.
108. However, the private employee may be afforded right to privacy protections if
the state of employment has its own state constitutional privacy provision. Lawsuits pend-
ing in California should help determine the application of such state privacy provisions to
private employee drug testing. See infra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
109. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 839-43.
110. Id. at 840 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
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corporations perform a "public function" as part of society, the
corporation should be held to the constitutional standards applica-
ble against the state itself.""' The extensive statutory and adminis-
trative law addressing labor, fair trade, consumer protection, and
licensing is arguably indicative of state involvement in private em-
ployer activities. 11 2 Further, since corporations assert extensive in-
fuence over individuals and the economic life of society they, in
effect, perform as government institutions.111 Additionally, failure
of the state to correct an imbalance of power between corporate
employers and employees could conceivably violate substantive
due process rights, such as privacy, just as if state action had
caused the same result.11 4
These considerations arguably support a contention that ran-
dom drug testing by a private corporate employer violates a fun-
damental right to privacy, and constitutes an unreasonable search
and seizure. However, no judicial decisions have addressed these
arguments. While state action is a "developing doctrine of great
11. Friedman, Corporate Power, Government By Private Groups, and the Law, 57
COLUM. L. REV. 155, 176 (1957):
The corporate organizations of business and labor have long ceased to be private
phenomena. That they have a direct and decisive impact on the social, economic,
and political life of the nation is no longer a matter of argument. It is an undenia-
ble fact of daily experience .... [W]e have to recognize that both business and
labor currently exercise vast powers. First, they have power over the millions of
men and women whose lives they largely control as employees or as members.
Second, they exercise power more indirectly, though not less powerfully, over the
unorganized citizens whose lives they largely control through standardized terms
of contract, through price policy, through the tempo of production and the terms
and conditions of labor. Lastly, they exercise control over the organized commu-
nity, represented by the organs of State, in a multitude of ways....
112. Hermann, Privacy, The Prospective Employee, and Employment Testing: The
Need to Restrict Polygraph and Personality Testing, 47 WASH. L. REV. 73, 148, (1971).
113. Friedman, supra note I ll, at 176-77. Control is exercised by
direct lobby pressures, control over the election and policies of the elected repre-
sentatives of the peoples, control over the appointment of the judiciary in many
States, and far-reaching control over the mass media of communication. In this
sense, "government" or "law-making" by private groups is today an irreversible
fact.
Id. at 176-77 (footnote omitted).
114. Hermann, supra note 112, at 149. For an excellent discussion of the relation-
ship between corporation and see Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activ-
ity-Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L.
REV. 933 (1952):
But, if there is [economic] power, accompanied by invasion of an individual right
guaranteed by the Constitution, then it would seem that the mere enjoyment of a
state corporate charter is sufficient justification for invoking operation of the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments. It has steadily been held that "whether the
corporate privilege shall be granted or withheld is always a matter of state policy.
If granted, the privilege is conferred in order to achieve an end which the State
deems desirable."
Id. at 951-52 (quoting Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 545 (1933)).
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vitality,""15 extending constitutional privacy protections through
this scheme is still a theory untested in the courts.' 16 Legislation
at this time appears to be the best and most certain way of ensur-
ing employee privacy protection from intrusive drug testing."17
II. TESTING AND THE PRIVATE EMPLOYEE
What, then, of the private employee (such as our hypothetical
Allan Bitwell) facing a drug test without the benefit of any fed-
eral or state constitutional arguments? While drug testing through
urinalysis is a fairly recent phenomenon in the private employ-
ment workplace,"" firms have utilized other drug testing measures
for some time. These measures have included employee surveil-
lance, searches, interrogation, blood-testing, and the use of poly-
graph tests."" The employee's right to privacy in the face of these
tests has been limited. 20
A. Private Drug Testing Case Law
Private employee lawsuits in the wake of job termination for
either testing positive for drugs or refusing to take the test are
rare.' 2' However, as testing becomes more widespread and as sig-
nificant precedents are established, arguably the number of such
lawsuits will increase. In the limited case law available, allega-
tions of invasion of privacy have not been a successful employee
cause of action against employers. 22
115. Hermann, supra note 112, at 142-43.
116. The framework for the theory is in place. It remains for the creative lawyer to
make these arguments successfully in court.
117. Many commentators on the use of polygraphs have reached the same conclu-
sion. "While there exists an analytic scheme for extending constitutional protections to the
employee of a private entrepreneur, this would clearly require further development in the
right of privacy as well as a significant extension of the scope of state action. Thus, it may
be desirable ... to provide legislative regulation .... Hermann, supra note 112, at 149.
"The legislative remedy is the best way to eliminate the polygraph examination in em-
ployment, and is perhaps the only practical way to do so." Comment, Privacy: The Poly-
graph in Employment, 30 ARK. L. REV. 35, 47 (1976) [hereinafter Privacy: The Polygraph
in Employment].
118. See supra note 2.
119. Schacter and Geidt, Controlling Workers' Substance Abuse, Nat'l L.J., Nov.
I1, 1985, at 20, col. 1.
120. Except for polygraph testing, these other measures, like random drug testing,
are largely unregulated. However, if mishandled, legal issues that could arise include as-
sault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment and tor-
tious invasion of privacy. Id. at 20, col. 3.
121. "To date, reported court decisions on the validity of drug testing have come
mainly from the public sector where government entities, in their capacity as employers,
are subject to the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures." Id. at 20, col. 1.
122. See infra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
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One of the first cases to decide the issue was Satterfield v.
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc. 2 3 Satterfield was employed
by Lockheed as an electronics missile technician and was required
to have an annual physical as part of his employment. 24 Begin-
ning in 1981, certain employees of the Lockheed facility in
Charleston, South Carolina were required to have a urine drug
screen for marijuana as part of their physical. 125 Satterfield's spec-
imen tested positive and he was terminated in August 1981.128
Satterfield and his wife brought suit alleging four causes of action,
including invasion of privacy. 127
The federal district court stated that it was unsure on which of
three grounds Satterfield was relying to assert the allegation of
invasion of privacy.' 28 The elements of this cause of action were
described as
"(1) the unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of [Sat-
terfield's] personality; or (2) the publicizing of [Satterfield's]
private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern;
or (3) the wrongful intrusion into [Sattefield's] private activities
in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame
or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities."'' 29
The court presumed Satterfield claimed either "publicizing of pri-
vate affairs" or "intrusion into private activities" since "[c]learly.
. .an unwarranted appropriation ...of personalities is not in-
volved."'13 The court found no support for invasion of privacy
under either theory.' 3 ' The court stated that there was no evi-
dence indicating that Satterfield's termination was "publicized,"
and further, "'[w]hen a plaintiff bases an action for invasion of
privacy on "intrusion" alone, bringing forth no evidence of public
disclosure, it is incumbent upon him to show a blatant and shock-
ing disregard of his rights, and serious mental or physical injury
or humiliation to himself resulting therefrom .. '. "'132 The dis-
123. 617 F. Supp. 1359 (D. S.C. 1985).
124. Id. at 1360.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1360. After his specimen tested positive, a retest was performed which
confirmed the positive result. See supra note 22 regarding the use of backup tests to con-
firm an initial positive test.
127. Satterfield, 617 F. Supp. at 1360. These causes of action were wrongful termi-
nation, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and invasion of privacy.
128. Id. at 1369.
129. Id. (quoting Corder v. Champion Road Machinery International Corp., 283
S.C. 520, 525, 324 S.E.2d 79, 82 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984)).
130. Satterfield, 617 F. Supp. at 1369.
131. Id. at 1370.
132. Id. (quoting Rycroft v. Gaddy, 281 S.C. 119, 124-25, 314 S.E.2d 39, 43 (S.C.
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trict court's rather superficial analysis points to judicial antago-
nism towards a privacy cause of action arising from intrusions oc-
curring in the workplace. Whether any employee could carry the
burden of showing a shocking disregard of his rights, and serious
mental or physical injury or humiliation as the result of an em-
ployee drug testing program is questionable. Whether the court
would have reached a different result if Satterfield's dismissal had
resulted from a random drug screen is, of course, speculative but
is quite unlikely based on the court's holding.133
In another private employee drug testing case, Luck v. South-
ern Pacific Transportation Company,134 the plaintiff, Luck, was a
computer engineer for Southern Pacific in San Francisco who was
told in July, 1985 that she was required to take a urinalysis
test.135 The test was part of a drug screening program instituted in
1984.136 Luck refused to take the test and was fired.137 She
brought suit alleging four causes of action including invasion of
privacy.138 San Francisco subsequently passed an amendment to
their municipal code prohibiting just this kind of random drug
screening.' 3 9 The impact this change in the code will have on
Luck's case is yet to be decided. 4
0
In another suit brought against Southern Pacific, an office man-
ager tested positive for cocaine in a random drug screen and was
required by the company to undergo drug rehabilitation. The em-
ployee consistently maintained the results were inaccurate and
took approximately twelve follow-up tests which were all negative.
However, the employee was ordered to attend drug counseling ses-
sions and to submit to regular testing. A superior court judge is-
sued an injunction ending the testing which subsequently resulted
in the employee's demotion.' 4' A second suit in the wake of that
133. Further case law is, of course, required before any judicial trends can be estab-
lished. The wait should not be long.
134. No. 843230 (Cal. Super. Ct. S.F., filed Aug. 5, 1985).
135. Stille, supra note 2, at 22, col. 1. There was no individualized suspicion that
Luck ever had used drugs on or off the job, and her job was unrelated to safety.
136. Southern Pacific claims that the drugs' tests have reduced their accident rate by
67% and reduced lost time and injuries by 25%. A company spokesman stated that the
urinalysis tests were a minor intrusion similar to walking through an airport metal detec-
tor. Id.
137. Luck was particularly sensitive about the drug test since she was three months
pregnant and was nervous about how that news might affect her job status. Id. at 22.
138. Schacter and Geidt, supra note 119, at 20, col. I. Her other causes of action
were wrongful termination in violation of public policy, retaliatory discharge for exercise of
constitutional rights and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
139. See infra notes 211-19 and accompanying text. Southern Pacific was, of course,
strongly opposed to the measure.
140. Also to be determined is what effect the California Constitution's guarantee of
privacy will have on random drug testing such as this. See supra note 59.
141. Stille, supra note 2, at 24, col. 3.
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demotion now is pending.1"2
Case law of an employee's alleged tortious invasions of employ-
ees' privacy through drug screening is clearly in the formative
stages. However, the related subject of employer polygraph (lie
detector) use as it relates to the employee's right to privacy is
well-documented and serves as a useful analogy to the use of ran-
dom drug screening programs.
B. Polygraph Testing and Employee Privacy
Employers' use of polygraphs 143 has generated a substantial
amount of case law,1 4 statutory regulation,145 and academic com-
mentary.' 46  About three quarters of the states have legislation
concerning the use of polygraphs. 47 Federal legislation which
would affect pre-employment polygraph use has been proposed
many times but never enacted. 48 The critics of polygraph testing
have argued that there is a loss of human dignity and individual
rights associated with the use of polygraphs. 4 9 Following the Roe
v. Wade decision in 1973, a federal district court judge in U.S. v.
Perkins"0 stated:
There is a right of privacy guaranteed to citizens of this nation.
With the uncontrolled development of technological means
142. Pettigrew v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., No. 849343 (Cal. Super. Ct.
S.F., filed Nov. 21, 1985).
143. "Polygraphs are also widely used by employers. Their use, however, has become
increasingly controversial in recent years, due to concern about their reliability and their
intrusion on employees' privacy and dignity." Schacter and Geidt, supra note 119, at 20,
col. 3.
144. See infra notes 156-67 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 15.
146. Recent articles include: Castagnera-Cain, Defamation, Invasion of Privacy and
Use of Lie Detectors in Employee Relations-An Overview, 4 GLENDALE L. REV. 189
(1982); Hermann, supra note 112; Nagle, supra note 15; Privacy: The Polygraph in Em-
ployment, supra note 117; Comment, The Polygraph and Pre-Employment Screening, 13
Hous. L. REv. 551 (1976); Note, Lie Detectors in the Employment Context, 35 LA. L.
REV. 694 (1975).
147. See supra note 15.
148. Various federal regulatory schemes for polygraphs have been introduced over
the last twenty years. Nagle, supra note 15, at 65. Advocates of such a measure say
polygraphs have become vehicles for employee intimidation and for screening out employ-
ees with unacceptable political or social beliefs. On the other hand, opponents claim they
are a vital employer weapon against employee theft and other crime. Opponents also argue
the states and not the federal government should regulate polygraph use.
149. As a case in point, the Pentagon in November 1985 revealed instructional
materials provided to military personnel being trained as polygraph examiners assessed sex-
ual preferences, and religious and racial associations of their subjects. Among the questions
excised: "Have you ever been a party to an abortion?" "Have you ever received sexual
stimulation in a crowded area?" "Has any member of your family been an alcoholic?"
"Have you ever consulted a psychiatrist?" San Diego Union, Dec. 15, 1985, sec. 1, col. 1.
150. 383 F. Supp. 922 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
11986]
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whereby anyone can invade the privacy of another under virtu-
ally any condition, the essential need for protection of this
prenumbral right becomes apparent....
Of particular concern is the lie detector. Many courts and em-
ployers, frustrated with the old ways, have determined that such
devices may properly be used to evaluate witnesses and employ-
ees. However, these devices are not fool-proof and they do con-
stitute an invasion of privacy. 15'
In the states having restrictive legislation, only twenty-one have
some form of -a polygraph "ban" statute. 152 These statutes are
generally of two types: Some say that no employer shall request
that an employee take the test;153 others merely say that no em-
ployer shall demand or require such a test.' The courts uni-
formly have upheld the validity of both types of state statutes fol-
lowing various constitutional challenges by employers.' 55
The validity of a "ban" statute was upheld against a constitu-
tional attack in State v. Century Camera, Inc. 56 This case in-
volved an action by the state against an employer and a security
firm which had conducted polygraph examinations on employees.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the state's "ban" statute
was neither overbroad nor vague in violation of the first amend-
ment, and did not constitute a deprivation of property without due
process of law.' 57 Among the substantial state interests justifying
the legislation at issue was the protection of an employee's expec-
tation of privacy.'15
In a more recent Minnesota case, a teller again brought an ac-
tion against her bank employer for emotional disability arising out
of the bank's request that she take a polygraph test. 15 The teller
again relied on the state polygraph statute. In affirming an award
of damages to the teller, the court emphasized the stated legisla-
tive concerns behind the statute which were "encouraging a har-
monious atmosphere in employer-employee relations, protecting
employees' expectations of privacy, discouraging practices which
may demean an individual's dignity, protect employees from ad-
verse inferences should they refuse the test, and avoid 'the coer-
151. Id. at 926 & n.1 (citation omitted).
152. Nagle, supra note 15, at 67. See also, Annotation, Validity of Statute Prohibit-
ing Employers from Suggesting or Requiring Polygraph or Similar Tests as Condition of
Employment or Continued Employment, 23 A.L.R. 4TH 187 (1982).
153. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN., Ch. 149, § 19B (West Supp. 1986).
154. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95 (Supp. 1986).
155. See infra notes 156-69 and accompanying text. See also Annotation, supra note
152.
156. 309 N.W.2d 735 (Minn. 1981).
157. Id. at 741, 745-46.
158. Id. at 743.
159. Kamrath v. Suburban Nat'l Bank, 363 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
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cive impact present in the solicitation.' "10
The Supreme Court of New Jersey similarly has upheld a state
"ban" statute against a constitutional attack in State v. Commu-
nity Distributers, Inc.'61 The Supreme Court of New Jersey held
there that a state statute prohibiting an employer from influenc-
ing, requesting, or requiring employees to take lie detector tests is
constitutional. The court stated that in view of the psychological
compulsion to take the test exerted on the employee, the tests
were a condition of continued employment within the meaning of
the statute."6 2 Regarding the constitutional argument, the court
held that the statute did not deprive the employer of the ability to
protect his property and thus did not deprive him of due process of
law.163
In upholding the constitutionality of these statutes, the courts
have emphasized the underlying intent of the legislature in enact-
ing these measures. The protection of worker privacy has been
identified as a large part of that intent.164
In a somewhat diferent case, Nothdurft v. Ross, 65 a New York
court recently considered the claim of an accredited psychological
stress examiner who challenged a state statute which prohibited
160. Id. at 111 (quoting Century Camera, 309 N.W.2d at 743).
161. 64 N.J. 479, 317 A.2d 697 (1974).
162. Id. at 485, 317 A.2d at 700.
163. Id. at 488-89, 317 A.2d at 702 (quoting Lincoln Union v. Northwestern I. &
M. Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949)): "[T]he due process clause of the Federal Constitution
should not be construed to straitjacket state legislatures 'when they attempt to suppress
business and industrial conditions which they regard as offensive to the public welfare.'"
164. In Community Distributors, the court noted the legislature in enacting the pol-
ygraph statute was very aware of the view of organized labor, in particular, that
polygraphs represented "uncalled for if not unconstitutional breaches of the employees'
rights to personal privacy and to remain free from involuntary self-incrimination." 64 N.J.
at 484, 317 A.2d at 701 (citations omitted).
Also worth noting is that even in states which have no form of polygraph "ban" statute,
courts have determined that polygraph examinations have invaded employee privacy. As an
example, in the New Hampshire case of O'Brien v. Papa Gino's, 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2321 (1986), plaintiff O'Brien was confronted by a superior with rumors that he had been
seen using drugs outside of work. O'Brien took a polygraph test and answered questions
relating to his alleged drug use. When the examiner's report indicated O'Brien was lying
about his drug use he was fired. O'Brien then brought suit for wrongful discharge and
invasion of privacy, claiming he was forced to take the test under the threat of losing his
job. On the invasion of privacy claim, a jury found the defendant's investigative techniques
to be "highly offensive.., and invasive of plaintiff's privacy." Id. at 2323. On appeal, the
defendant employer claimed O'Brien's right to privacy could not have been invaded be-
cause the company personnel manual forbade use of illegal drugs thereby giving the em-
ployer implied permission to make whatever investigations it deemed necessary. Id. The
appeals court dismissed the claim noting that the jury's finding of the examination as
"highly offensive ... and invasive of plaintiff's privacy" indicated that the defendant had
exceeded the scope of any consent O'Brien had arguably given by accepting employment.
Id.
165. 104 Misc. 2d 898, 429 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1980) aff'd, 445 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1981).
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stress examinations of employees or prospective employees. 166 The
court held that the legislature had a right to enact the law on the
rationale that such devices grossly invaded individual privacy.1 67
Apparently, the courts have concluded that the state legisla-
tures, in enacting these prohibitive statutes, weighed the advan-
tages and disadvantages of the polygraph. The courts have found
that the public welfare would be furthered by prohibiting poly-
graph use in the employment context. Moreover, courts have
noted that legislation otherwise constitutional is not invalidated
because it may cause hardship to particular employers.1 68 As the
court stated in State v. Century Camera, Inc., the protection of
the individual, including the individual's right to privacy, was a
substantial state interest which justified polygraph legislation.1 69
Legislative limitations on employer drug testing arguably could
be justified by the same substantial state interests expressed in the
polygraph legislation and cases. The legislative concerns about
privacy expressed by the Century Camera court would be equally,
if not more, applicable to a private employer's random drug test-
ing program. A limiting statute on drug testing could also en-
courage "a harmonious atmosphere in employer-employee rela-
tions," would protect "employees' expectations of privacy," and
would discourage "practices which may demean an individual's
dignity."170 For these reasons, constitutional challenges to legisla-
tion prohibiting drug testing will likely fail as such challenges
failed in the polygraph context.
The many law review articles and other legal commentaries on
employer use of polygraphs have, of course, all addressed the pri-
vacy issue.17 1 The focus of other commentaries in the polygraph
area has been on a state or federal legislative remedy, based on
the recognition that constitutional arguments are not available to
166. The plaintiff argued the statute created "an unwarranted distinction and arbi-
trary discrimination" against stress examiners and in effect denied him equal protection of
the laws. Id. at 901, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
167. The court stated: "The conclusion is inescapable that the legislature, in passing
Article 20-B Labor Law, intended to protect an individual's right to privacy on the basis
that such mechanisms grossly invade the privacy of an individual who is subjected to such
device, often without his or her knowledge or consent." Id. at 901, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
168. "Just as benefits to a private person or class do not invalidate legislation
predominantly in the public interest, neither do apparent hardships imposed on a private
person or a specific class invalidate legislation which benefits the public as a whole." Id. at
902, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
169. 309 N.W.2d 735, 743 (Minn. 1981).
170. Kamrath v. Suburban Nat'l Bank, 363 N.W.2d 108, 111 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985). It is difficult to imagine a practice more demeaning than handing a full cup of urine
to one's work supervisor.
171. See supra note 146.
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the private employee absent state action.172
The argument has been made that the "zones of privacy" recog-
nized in Griswold v. Connecticut17a are in "competition" in the
employer-employee relationship. Thus, one author has stated that
a competition exists between:
the employee's privacy interest in keeping his personal affairs to
himself, and the employer's privacy interest in the internal af-
fairs of his own business. Any balancing test, however, should be
resolved in favor of the employee because of the economic power
wielded over him by the employer, the employer's arguable
waiver over his right to privacy by advertising employment, as
well as by the Court's demonstrated unwillingness to protect em-
ployer privacy in the face of his violation of civil liberties. 74
The authors almost uniformly have called for a legislative rem-
edy as the best and most practical means to protect employee pri-
vacy rights against polygraph testing. 175 Some of the considera-
tions for this conclusion are that an employee would not sue his
employer for invasion of privacy in most cases because it would
jeopardize his job. Further, without a statute, a job applicant re-
fused work because of a polygraph exam would be required to ex-
pend much time and money in the courts in an attempt to assert
an intrusion of privacy cause of action.'78
The clear national trend is towards more state,7 if not fed-
eral, 7 8 legislation curtailing the use of polygraphs. That drug test-
ing legislation, now in its infancy, 7 9 should and will be enacted
for the same right to privacy arguments articulated against
polygraphs is predictable.
172. See supra notes 105-17 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
174. Privacy: The Polygraph in Employment, supra note 117, at 44 (footnotes
omitted).
175. See, e.g., those articles listed supra note 117.
176. Privacy: The Polygraph in Employment, supra note 117, at 47.
177. Only eleven states neither restrict the use of polygraph testing nor require li-
censing of examiners. Nagle, supra note 15, at 67.
178. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
179. At least four states are currently working on some type of drug testing legisla-
tion: California, Maryland, Maine and Oregon.
In November, 1985, the City of San Francisco passed a local ordinance prohibiting pri-
vate employer random drug testing except where there is "reasonable grounds to believe
that an employee's faculties are impaired on the job; and ... the employee is in a position
where such impairment presents a clear and present danger to the physical safety of the
employee, another employee or to a member of the public.. ." and the employee has an
opportunity to have the sample tested at an independent laboratory and to explain the
results. SAN FRANCISCO CAL, POLICE CODE art. 33A, § 3300A.5 (1985) [hereinafter Po-
LICE CODE]. See infra notes 211-19 and accompanying text.
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C. Labor-Management Drug Testing Agreement
Employees subject to collective bargaining agreements which
have no provisions for employer drug testing rights may have
grounds for refusing to submit to such tests. 180 However, workers
have been discharged by their employers in many cases following
such refusals.'
Such actions have been most commonly reviewed by arbitrators
from the perspective of whether the employee's refusal to submit
to an exam, viewed independently or together with eye-witness
testimony and other available evidence of drug involvement, con-
stitutes the "just cause" required for discharge under most
union contracts. Questions of privacy ...are also invariably
raised in connection with drug testing. 82
Scholars have recognized that there is a fundamental balancing
of employer interests in the conduct of employees in the workplace
against employee interests in his privacy and personal dignity. 83
However, the employer apparently holds most of the cards in the
arbitration of employee disputes since it is generally acknowledged
that "the employer is permitted by law and by contract to make
such rules and regulations as are not inconsistent with the parties
collective bargaining agreement ... even though at times they
may impinge on the employee's personal privacy.' 84 Perhaps the
best way to curtail employee drug tests is for an express agree-
ment relating to drug testing to be included in the labor-manage-
ment agreement. 85 Prior agreements have proved successful in
preventing employer use of polygraphs. 186 Recently, drug testing
agreements have also been made part of the bargaining process.
As an example, Teamster's President Jackie Presser and em-
ployer grievance committee chairman Arthur Bunte, Jr., reached
an accord under the National Master Freight Agreement in
1984.187 According to the agreement, an employer with reason to
believe an employee is intoxicated may request blood and urine
specimens. Moreover, an employee's refusal to give both speci-
mens will constitute a presumption of drug intoxication.' 8 Even
with such express drug testing provisions, it appears that, to find
180. Susser, supra note 10, at 48.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. ELKOURI AND ELKOURI. How ARBITRATION WORKS 785 (4th ed. 1985).
184. Scheiber, Tests and Questionnaires in the Labor-Management Relationship, 20
LAB. L. 695, 697 (1969).
185. Drug testing agreements will likely become important bargaining chips in fu-
ture labor negotiations.
186. Privacy: The Polygraph in Employment, supra note 117, at 38-39.
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the test proper, the arbitrator must be satisfied that the employees
have been given warning of the test.' 8
In In re American Standard,190 an employer fired a worker who
refused to take a drug test after other employees observed sus-
pected drug-induced behavior.""' The arbitrator, in concluding the
termination was proper, noted that the company policy against
drug use was well known by the employee, that the employment
contract gave management the right to require medical exams to
determine fitness for work at any time, and that the employer rea-
sonably believed that the grievant was, in fact, on drugs .' 2
Labor-management agreements and arbitration may be a par-
tial answer to limits on employer drug testing. However, this
method has some substantial problems. First, arbitration is not
usually a recourse for nonunion employees.' 93 As has been noted,
private employees without benefit of union membership have little
privacy protection. Second, arbitration decisions are not binding
beyond the particular case decided. Arbitrators are not mandated
to follow particular precedents, though some decisions may estab-
lish plant or company-wide precedent. 94 Based on all of the fore-
going considerations, the individual states should consider, and
implement, legislation limiting private employer drug testing as
the best way to protect the privacy rights of its citizens. 95
III. A PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
Most would probably agree that the general increase in testing
of all types is an indication that personal freedom is suffering
more and more as a victim of technology. 98 Polygraph legislation,
judicial criticism, and union antagonism toward polygraphs argua-
189. Id. For example, employers must give 30-60 days' notice of drug tests in con-
nection with Department of Transportation examinations. Id.
190. 77 LA 1085 (1981) (Katz Arb.).
191. Id. at 1086-87.
192. Id. at 1087-88.
193. "The basic function of the grievance procedure and arbitration in private em-
ployment is to assure compliance with the collective bargaining agreement." ELKOURI AND
ELKOURI, supra note 183, at 52. Moreover, while many states have some type of arbitra-
tion statute, most are general in nature and do not apply to labor arbitration. Id. at 39.
Common law arbitration also provides very little support for executory agreements to arbi-
trate. Id. at 40.
194. Id. at 421-22.
195. Federal drug testing legislation would obviously provide the quickest and most
effective way of providing privacy protections in the workplace. However, if polygraph leg-
islation is any indication, congressional drug testing measures would face a very long wait.
Polygraph legislation has been proposed during every session of congress since 1975. Nagle,
supra note 15, at 65.
196. Urinalysis is only one of the more intrusive ways to search and detect drugs.
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bly indicate that technology has overstepped its bounds and in-
truded on the individual's domain. As occurred with polygraph
testing, employers' widespread use of drug testing by any method
should be legislatively regulated for the same protective
reasons.
197
In those states already imposing a ban on polygraph testing,
this view is consonant with one of the principal purposes of such
statutes, to prevent gross invasions of an employee's privacy.,, 8
Carrying the analogy a step further, prohibiting polygraph testing
while allowing the employer to invade worker privacy to inspect
bodily fluids makes little sense. Drug testing arguably is much
more intrusive than polygraph testing.199 Those states without any
check on any type of employee testing should take a fresh look at
the rapid growth of drug testing technology which is eroding the
privacy of its citizens in an unprecedented way.
Admittedly, under some circumstances and for certain classes
of employees, accurate drug testing2 0 would support a broad pol-
icy of protecting public health and safety.20 1 As documented in
the public employment sector, drug testing can be an important
employer tool in safeguarding both employees and the public in
inherently hazardous occupations.20 2 Testing also can be useful
where the employer has a legitimate reasonable suspicion that the
employee is using or selling drugs in the workplace. 03 However,
an employer's decision to randomly test all workers for drugs
should be expressly prohibited as being a violation of the right to
privacy.20 4 There are some indications that employer drug testing
limitations are a growing trend. As an example, the Department
197. Virtually all of the same arguments advanced against polygraphs can be made
against random drug testing: Chronic unreliability, loss of personal liberties through inva-
sion of privacy, and the possibility of the dissemination and availability of test results are
most often mentioned.
198. See, e.g., Nothdurft v. Ross, 104 Misc.2d 898, 901, 429 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846
(1980) aJffd, 445 N.Y.S.2d 222 (1981).
199. Being forced to urinate into a cup on a semiregular basis unquestionably is a
practice demeaning individual dignity and violating the employee's reasonable expectation
of privacy.
200. See supra note 22 for accuracy problems inherent in drug testing.
201. See supra notes 62-104 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985), dis-
cussed supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., McDonnell v. Hunter, 746 F.2d 785 (8th Cir. 1984), discussed supra
notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
204. Random drug testing strikes at the heart of the "right to be let alone."
While some have asserted that people have nothing to fear unless they have some-
thing to hide, protection against unwarranted intrusions into personal matters
means much more than safety from minor embarrassments, or even possible in-
crimination. Invasions of privacy have the potential to reveal one's associations,
private enjoyments, or personal views ....
Peck, supra note 58, at 898.
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of Defense (DoD) has implemented a civilian drug testing pro-
gram 20 5 which requires only employees or job applicants for posi-
tions designated as "critical jobs" to submit to urinalysis drug
testing. 20 6 The relevant "critical job" category for the private em-
ployer is "[]obs involving protection of property or persons from
harm. '20 7 Further, the Directive allows testing only in the follow-
ing circumstances:
(1) Before appointment or selection.(2) Periodically after appointment or selection on the basis of
neutral criteria.(3) When there is probable cause to believe that an employee is
under the influence of a controlled substance while on duty.
(4) In an examination authorized by the Department of Defense
or the DoD Component regarding a mishap or safety investiga-
tion for the purpose of accident analysis and the development of
countermeasures. 208
Before the initial test can be given, however, each employee
must be informed of the reasons for the urinalysis, the conse-
quences of a positive result or refusal to cooperate, including ad-
verse action, and the opportunity to submit supplemental medical
documentation that might support the legitimate use of a specific
drug.2 1 The DoD Directive recognizes protection of life, limb and
national security as valid reasons for requiring drug testing and
the accompanying implication that any privacy intrusion is out-
weighed by the overall benefits of such testing. The Directive also,
however, clearly limits drug testing to certain classes of
employees.210
The City of San Francisco passed a landmark privacy protec-
tion law in November 1985.211 The law prohibits private employ-
ers212 from demanding, requiring, or requesting employees 213 to
205. Department of Defense Directive, No. 1010.9, April 8, 1985 (copy on file at
California Western Law Review Offices).
206. Id. at % D.
207. Id. at F.I.c.(3).
208. Id. at I F.2.a.
209. Id. at % F.2.b.
210. Id. at t F.2.a.
211. POLICE CODE, supra note 179. This article is entitled "Prohibition of Employer
Interference with Employee Relationships and Activities and Regulation of Employer Drug
Testing of Employees." The ordinance, introduced by Supervisor Bill Maher, passed 9-1.
Stated Supervisor Maher: "This is one of these bills that hits you viscerally.... Some
people feel you've got to crack down on drug use, others feel that random drug testing is
outrageous. I think its's outrageous to line up people without any suspicion that they're
using drugs and order them to take tests or their career is finished." City Mayor Dianne
Feinstein opposed the measure saying drug use is "greatly increasing and creating major
problems" and warned it sends "a tacit message" about permitting drug use at work. San
Diego Union, Nov. 28, 1985, at A-3, col. 3.
212.
"Employer" shall mean the City and County of San Francisco, any individual,
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take any type of random blood, urine, or encephalographic test as
a condition of continued employment. 214 The bill, vigorously op-
posed by Southern Pacific Transportation Company,215 among
others, identifies the strong policy concerns behind the measure:
It is the public policy of the City and County of San Francisco
that all citizens enjoy the full benefit of the right to privacy in
the workplace guaranteed to them by Article 1, Section 1 of the
California Constitution. It is the purpose of this Article to pro-
tect employees against unreasonable inquiry and investigation
into off-the-job conduct, associations, and activities not directly
related to the actual performance of job responsibilities. 216.
Under this law, employers will be allowed to require specific em-
ployees to submit to blood or urine testing only when:
(a) the employer has reasonable grounds to believe that an
employee's faculties are impaired on the job; and
(b) the employee is in a position where such impairment
presents a clear and present danger to the physical safety of the
employee, another employee or to a member of the public; and
(c) the employer provides the employee, at the employer's ex-
pense, the opportunity to have the sample tested or evaluated by
State licensed independent laboratory/testing facility [sic] and
provides the employee with a reasonable opportunity to rebut or
explain the results.217
San Francisco thus has recognized that the employee's right to
privacy must be protected to help maintain the balance between
that right and the employer's right to run his business as he sees
fit. By requiring "reasonable grounds" and a "clear and present
danger," San Francisco's ordinance affords private employees the
same protections that public employees currently enjoy.2 1 8 Fur-
firm, corporation, partnership, or other organization or group of persons however
organized, located or doing business within the City and County of San Francisco,
that employs personnel for salary or wages, or any person acting as an agent of
such an organization.
POLICE CODE, supra note 179, § 3300A.2(3).
213.
"Employee" shall mean any person working for salary or wages within the City
and County of San Francisco, other than members of the uniformed ranks of the
police, sheriff's and fire departments, police department communication dispatch-
ers, and any persons operating emergency service vehicles for the City and County
of San Francisco.
Id. § 3300A.2(1).
214. Id. § 3300A.5.
215. Southern Pacific has argued that random drug testing "represents a legitimate
business interest and is consistent with a public policy that prohibits the use of illegal drugs
and encourages [employee) rehabilitation." Bishop, Drug Testing Comes to Work, CAL.
LAw., Apr. 1986, at 28, 31.
216. POLICE CODE, supra note 179, § 3300A.i.
217. Id. at § 3300A.5.
218. See supra notes 61-103 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases estab-
lishing public employees' rights regarding drug testing.
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ther, by requiring the employer to provide tested workers a rea-
sonable opportunity to "rebut or explain" test results, the City has
ensured that fourteenth amendment due process requirements will
also be satisfied by private employers.219
While San Francisco is in the vanguard of privacy protection
lawmaking, other cities and states around the nation soon may
follow. 220 The states should enact measures substantively similar
to the one adopted by San Francisco. This would avoid problems
of piecemeal municipal legislation while giving employees immedi-
ate protection from random drug screening programs. These mea-
sures would help protect the fundamental right to privacy found
by the Supreme Court to exist in the United States Constitu-
tion.221 More specifically, drug testing legislation would affirm the
individual's "right to be let alone,"222 "the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of pesonal matters," 223 and the general con-
cept of "personal liberty" founded in the fourteenth amend-
ment.224 Indeed, in the states that have already passed state con-
stitutional amendments expressly recognizing the right to
privacy, 225 drug testing legislation is an element essential to that
guaranty.
The policy concerns of the right to privacy are pervasive. The
mandate for the states is clear. The time for legislation is now.
CONCLUSION
If the right to privacy is to continue to exist in any significant
way, there must be explicit protections. The individual's right to
privacy and right to be left alone from unwarranted intrusions
into his private life must be safeguarded. As we approach the
twenty-first century, George Orwell's vision of a world without
privacy becomes all too possible with each new technological ad-
vancement. Unlimited drug testing by private employers is one
219. The important rationale behind due process is to prevent inaccurate and wrong
decisions. In the drug testing context, the effect of a wrong decision by an employer can
obviously have a devastating effect on the employee, as well as potentially damaging effects
on company morale. At a minimum, the employee should have notice and a hearing before
his supervisors before termination. This presumes, of course, that the employee is aware
that a drug testing program has been implemented.
220. Lawmakers in California, Maine, Maryland and Oregon currently are working
on statewide drug testing measures. Castro, supra note 1, at 59.
221. Whether it exists under either a penumbra of constitutional rights as in Gris-
wold, or under the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty described in Roe v.
Wade, the right to privacy is now unequivocally based in the Constitution. The extent of
that right is still an open question. See supra notes 32-48 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 35.
223. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977).
224. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 115 (1973).
225. See supra note 31.
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step too far towards that possibility.
What are the options? Judicial recognition of state action to
allow federal constitutional privacy arguments against private em-
ployers affords at best limited protection to the majority of the
workforce.2 26 The existing case law appears to cut against em-
ployee use of a tortious invasion of privacy argument, and any
relief through the courts would be compensatory, not injunctive.227
Labor-management drug testing agreements have offered privacy
protections22 but they do not help nonunion workers who consti-
tute the vast majority of workers. 2 9 Legislation, such as that en-
acted by San Francisco, is the best and most effective way to pro-
tect employee privacy by putting specific limitations on drug
testing and by eliminating random sweeps.230 Through legislation
requiring reasonable suspicion at a minimum, states will ensure
that off-the-job activity remains within the individual's private do-
main unless the activity adversely impacts on job performance or
safety.231
Each state must do what is best for its citizens. State legislation
defining the scope of private employer drug testing should be part
of that mandate. Without it, the private employee faces a bleak
future of further encroachments on an already eroded "zone of
privacy."
Steven E. Lake
226. See supra notes 105-17 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 123-42 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 180-94 and accompanying text.
229. In 1984, union workers comprised 18.8% of the total full-time work force. This
was down from 20.1% in 1983. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1986 424
(106th ed. 1985).
230. See supra notes 211-19 and accompanying text.
231. In this way, the private employee would be afforded the same protections which
currently exist in the public sector.
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